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Abstract
We investigate a causal effect of crime on the number of betting shops by using annual data
from London boroughs (2007-2015). Using an instrumental variable strategy, we estimate a panel
model accounting for omitted variables and borough-level heterogeneity. Our estimation results
show that a 1% increase in crime rate causes a 1.2% increase in the number of betting shops (per
capita). Put differently, a new betting shop opens in a borough for every 1.4% increase in the local
crime rate, on average. The causal effect is robust across a variety of specifications, although the
magnitude varies across models.
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1 Introduction
In February 2013, Newham council in east London rejected multinational bookmaker Paddy Power’s
application for a licence to open a new betting shop, arguing that it would attract crime and anti-social
behaviour. Consequently, Paddy Power filed a lawsuit against the council. Newham happens to be one
of the most economically deprived areas of Britain, with 82 gambling shops (6 betting shops per-square
mile).1 In June 2013, the Magistrate Court overturned the council’s decision, allowing the bookmaker
to open a new betting shop. The decision was based on the lack of strong evidence regarding the causal
link between betting shops and crime. After this court decision, Mr Ian Corbett, council executive
member, decried that ‘Ministers fail to understand how the legislation is toothless in dealing with the
clustering of betting shops.’2 Although this was the first case of its kind, the relationship between the
number of betting shops and crime warrants a deeper investigation.
It is often suggested that gambling shops attract criminal behaviour in their vicinity. If this is
indeed true, criminals may consume a non-negligible fraction of the gambling services. This leads to
the question: do gambling firms consider crime-prone individuals as their consumers and open more
shops in high-crime areas? The focus of this paper is to investigate this important question using annual
borough-level data from London boroughs (2007-2015). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study to highlight the effect of local crime on the supplied number of betting shops. This is particularly
relevant to policy in the U.K. as one of the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act (2005) is to keep
crime separate from gambling.3
Our econometric model is based upon explaining the number of betting shops using demand and
supply drivers alongside local crime. Specifically, we add control variables such as unemployment, hous-
ing price, average age, gender distribution, borough, and time fixed effects. We correct the endogeneity
bias by averaging the crime rate of the neighbourhood boroughs as an instrumental variable for the
crime rate. The main identifying assumption is that criminals travel across boroughs, while gamblers
do not.
The estimated parameters suggest that an increase in crime causes a rise in the number of betting
shops. Specifically, an increase in crime rate of 1% causes the gambling shop count to increase by
1Regarding the geographic relationship, an anonymous official within the council commented ‘We mapped out where
crimes and disorder take place and compared that with where the betting shops are - and it lit up like a Christmas tree.’
2See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-22934278 for the details of court decisions and official comments provided by
Newham borough council and the bookmaker.
3Licensing objective: ‘Preventing gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with crime or
disorder or being used to support crime.’ Source: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/19/section/1
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1.2% per capita. We perform robustness checks by comparing parameter estimates across four models:
(1) instrumental variable (IV) in a two-stage least squares model, (2) panel model (fixed and random
effect), (3) instrumental variable in a panel model, and (4) lagged-dependent variable model. The
empirical results indicate that borough heterogeneity and omitted variables play key roles and should
be accounted for. Our key finding holds across the various models, however the magnitude of the effect
varies.
Most of the literature focuses on the U.S. casino industry on which rigid zone restrictions are
enforced.4 However, these studies only examine the direction of causality opposite to our research.
Gazel, Rickman, and Thompson (2001) investigate the changes in the number of crimes before and
after the openings of casinos in Wisconsin counties between 1981-1994. They report an increase in local
crime after the opening of casinos. Grinols and Mustard (2006) comprehensively examine county-level
data across the U.S. between 1977-1996. They show that neighbourhood crime increases are relatively
low over a short period, but become gradually larger in the long term.
Regarding the U.K., some studies report positive correlation between gambling activities and local
crime. Brown (1987) uses data from Gamblers Anonymous in the U.K. and shows that the crime
patterns of gamblers are similar to people with addiction to drugs. Based on survey data, Wardle
et al. (2010) report that gamblers, on average, are from socio-economically deprived backgrounds.
Furthermore, Astbury and Thurstain-Goodwin (2007) survey the local demographics around betting
shops, reporting that they tend to be located in areas with high degrees of socio-economic deprivation.
Economic studies exploring the gambling-crime causal link are rare for the United States, but they are
virtually non-existent for the U.K.
The scope and limitation of this research should be mentioned. In this research, rather than con-
ducting a comprehensive dual-causality investigation, we simply focus on studying the effect of local
crime on the number of betting shops.
As a disclaimer, we mask the borough names throughout this research.5 This is because the goal of
this research is not to manifest the fact that some specific boroughs have high or low concentrations of
crimes (and betting shops) but to investigate the causal effect.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the background of the U.K. betting industry
and discusses the data. Section 3 illustrates the regression model, identification assumptions, and
4Eadington (1999) and Walker (2007) provide comprehensive surveys on the US casino industry and its economic
effects.
5The exception is the City of London and Westminster.
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Figure 1: London Boroughs
Figure 2: Total Number of Betting Shops in
London Boroughs (excluding the City of Lon-
don)
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Figure 3: Per Capita Number of Betting Shops
by Borough
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Figure 4: Per Capita Number of Crimes by
Borough
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economic insights behind the model. Section 4 discusses the estimation results and provides policy
implications. Lastly, Section 5 concludes and provides potential directions for future extensions.
2 Indutsry and Data Description
This section describes the key features of the U.K. gambling industry, discusses the data used, and
presents basic descriptive statistics.
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Figure 5: Correlation between Number of Betting Shops and Crime for 2007-2015 (Outliers are from
the City of Westminster)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Description
Num. Num. Unemp- Average Average Gender Average num.
of betting of crimes loyment house age ratio of (per capita)
shops per capita rate price (in (among 18+) (males divided crimes in
per capita £10 million) by females) connected boroughs
Mean 0.00022 0.091 8.041 0.043 43.66 0.957 0.096
S.t.d. 0.00006 0.026 2.299 0.018 2.81 0.046 0.021
Min 0.00008 0.048 3.500 0.024 37.57 0.892 0.057
25th percentile 0.00017 0.071 6.200 0.032 41.56 0.919 0.080
Median 0.00022 0.088 7.800 0.038 43.63 0.953 0.093
75th percentile 0.00026 0.110 9.700 0.047 45.51 0.978 0.107
Max 0.00039 0.167 14.200 0.137 49.11 1.114 0.154
The sample size is 276. Observation unit is annual and borough-level (excluding the City of London and Westminster).
2.1 Gambling Industry in the U.K.
In the U.K., it is common to see a sizable number of betting shops in each modestly populated city due
to the lax zone restrictions.6 Common forms of gambling include bingo, casinos, lotteries, betting and
arcades. According to the Association of the British Bookmakers, there are more than 8,700 betting
shops in the U.K. as of 2013, which generate £3.2 billion GDP.7 Betting has been the largest gambling
sector with gross a yield of roughly £1.5 billion, and it accounts for the employment of 55,234 individuals
6In the U.K., the Gambling Act (2005) enacted to form the regulating authority, the Gambling Commission, which
issues operating licences. The Act also authorised the local municipal councils to provide licences to gambling premises.
Objections against new licences can be raised. According to the parliament document, ‘Objections can be raised against
an application for a new premises licence by interested parties (eg people living close by) and responsible authorities (eg
the police).’
7‘The Truth about Betting Shops and Gaming Machines’ Source: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/248922/Association_of_British_Bookmakers.pdf
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as of March 2013.8 Betting sector consists of betting shops and online betting. Our focus of study is
betting shops since it comprises of the majority of betting activity.9
Betting shops are premises in which a gambler can legally place bets in person with a licensed
bookmaker. Bets can be placed on virtually anything, including a wide range of sports games, horse
races, motor races, awards ceremonies (e.g. the Oscars), and election outcomes. In a typical betting
shop, there is a counter where gamblers submit betting slips and numerous television screens that post
betting odds for live events. In addition, a typical betting shop has some high-tech gambling machines
that allow gamblers to bet on computerised games (e.g. poker games, black jack, slot machines, roulette,
etc.). Importantly, upon winning, a gambler can immediately obtain cash at a betting shop. Instant
gratification is one of the underlying commonalities between criminals and gamblers, a key modeling
concept addressed in the next section.
Contrary to their popularity, betting shops are not free from social controversy. Local councils,
which grant licences for betting shop premises, are concerned about the neighbourhood demographics.
This is because betting shops could influence local demographics and their public policies, such as
the treatment of addictive gamblers by social workers.10 Education authorities may also be concerned
if children regularly witness anti-social behaviour around gambling shops, which are often located on
high streets (busy market places), and may perceive such problem gambling activities as common in
society.11 Thus, investigation into the relationship between local crimes and betting shops is particularly
relevant to British society.
2.2 Data Sources
We obtain data from various sources. Betting shop data is obtained from publicly available data
sources such as the UK Data Service and the Gambling Commission.12 The crime data used is the total
number of crimes observed in the Metropolitan Police Service’s record system. Unemployment rates are
collected from the Official Labour Market Statistics of Nomis. Average housing prices are obtained from
8The second largest gambling sector is casinos, which provided employment to 15,010 individuals. Source: http:
//www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/Gambling-data-analysis/statistics/Industry-statistics.aspx
9Only 4% people participated in online betting according to a survey by Gambling Commission in 2010. Source:
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/british%20gambling%20prevalence%20survey%202010.pdf
10The National Health Service (NHS) website states: ‘There may be as many as 593,000 problem gamblers in Great
Britain. The anticipation and thrill of gambling creates a natural high that can become addictive.’
11One of the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act (2005) is: protecting children and other vulnerable people from
being harmed or exploited by gambling.
12Furthermore, this publicly available data is cleaned by matching it to the data provided by local councils via Freedom
of Information requests.
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the Price Paid Data of the Land Registry, which collects traded real-estate property prices. Average
housing prices are inflation-adjusted using 2016 consumer price index. The data on population, adult
gender ratio, and adult average age is obtained from the Round Demographic Projection collected by
the Greater London Authority. As the legal age for gambling in the U.K. is 18 and above, the gender
ratios and average ages are calculated for ages 18 and up.13
2.3 Data Description and Summary Statistics
We use annual data for the London boroughs from 2007-2015. There are 33 boroughs in the London
Area, as illustrated in Figure 1. We exclude the City of London and the City of Westminster from our
analysis. Our primary reason to exclude the City of London is the limited access to crime data from
the City of London police.14 Also, the City of London is generally recognised as a financial district for
corporate offices with low residential population. This makes it different from the other boroughs in our
analysis, which are mostly residential. We also exclude the City of Westminster because it is an outlier
in terms of the patterns and magnitude of crime and number of betting shops. Figure 4 shows that the
crime rate in the City of Westminster has persistently been much higher than in the other boroughs
(close to 30% up until 2011).15 In fact, the outliers observed in Figures 3 - 5 are all from the City of
Westminster. After excluding these two boroughs, we have 276 annual borough-level observations for
our study.16
There are approximately 2,000 betting shops in London and this number has remained fairy stable
across the study period, as shown in Figure 2. In other words, there is one betting shop for approx-
imately every 4,500 residents in London. Figure 3 plots the per capita number of betting shops and
suggests heterogeneity among the boroughs. As some boroughs are more populated than others, the
number of betting shops is normalised by population.17 Betting shops per capita also change over time,
depicting the presence of entry and exit in the gambling industry.
Figure 4 plots the numbers of crimes per capita by borough. In addition, following the tradition
of precedent crime literature in Economics, we normalise the number of crimes by the residential
13Adult gender ratio is calculated as (18+ years old male population) divided by (18+ years old female population).
14The City of London Police is different from the London Metropolitan Police Service, which exercises jurisdiction over
the other 32 boroughs.
15Due to its sightseeing nature and its associations with well-known historical sites, crime in the City of Westminster
(mostly thefts and muggings involving tourists) could be considered different from other boroughs.
16The math is 276 = 9 years × 31 boroughs − 3. There are 3 missing data points in our dataset. Specifically, one
sample is missing from a borough in 2007, and the other two samples are missing from another borough in 2007-2008.
17Population un-adjusted figures are found in the Appendix.
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population (Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Levitt (1996), Draca, Machin, and Witt (2011)). Similar
to the per capita numbers of betting shops, there is large heterogeneity among boroughs, indicating the
fact that some boroughs are more crime-prone than others. In addition, there is a decreasing trend in
crimes over our sampling period.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the number of betting shops and the number of crimes per
capita. The figure indicates a strong correlation between betting shops and crime, and the correlation
coefficient is 0.844 (significant at α = 0.01).
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics, further confirming substantial demographic heterogeneity
across boroughs. While unemployment rate ranges from 3.5% to 14.2%, average housing prices are
spread from £240,000 to £1.37 million. The adult average age ranges from 37.6 to 49.1. The adult
gender ratios are relatively less dispersed from 0.89 to 1.11. In summary, we observe substantial
heterogeneity across boroughs and over time, hence we account for this in the empirical model.
3 Empirical Model
In this section, we explain the econometric model and discuss the identification assumptions needed for
our model.
We use the following indices: b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 31} stands for a borough index, and t ∈ {2007, 2008, · · · , 2015}
represents an annual time index. We use the constant elasticity model,
ln(BetShopsb,t) = β ln(Crimesb,t) + c
′
b,tγ + λt + αb + ub,t, (1)
where BetShopsb,t is the number of betting shops per capita, Crimesb,t is the per capita number of
reported crimes, and cb,t is a vector of control variables, which includes unemployment rate, average
housing price, average age among adults, and the ratio of male to female population. Note that the β
is the primary interest of our causal investigation, while γ is a vector of control variable coefficients.
The equation (1) could be seen as a reduced-form solution of a zero-profit condition in an entry
model equilibrium, such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Mankiw and Whinston (1986), and Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991). Given local consumer characteristics, firms enter into (and remain in) a market until
the additional profit from opening a new shop vanishes. The left-hand side of equation (1) captures the
entry decisions of gambling firms, while the right-hand side captures the demand and supply drivers of
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the decision, such as local demographics, macro-economic environment, and tax structure.
In Equation (1), we propose two channels through which crime affects the demand for betting shops.
First, crime and betting are both inherently ‘risky’ activities. Crime has a high opportunity cost if
someone gets arrested, and in gambling one can quickly lose money. Crime and gambling are also
instantly gratifying activities as the rewards are immediate in both. Hence, if the number of crimes in
a borough increases, there is an increase in the population who could also have a demand for gambling.
Second, money related crime (e.g. drug-dealing) could lead to extra cash which can be used to consume
gambling services. Subsequently, the betting industry may respond by increasing the number of betting
shops.18
The year-by-year time effect, λt, captures changes that affect all boroughs homogeneously. Such
aggregate components include gambling-related taxes, popular betting events (e.g. the Olympics, elec-
tions, etc.), and London-wide activities (such as anti-gambling campaigns and social workers’ treatment
for addictive gamblers). The borough effect term, αb, captures a borough-level heterogeneity not cap-
tured by the control variables that does not change over time, such as a borough-level gambling culture
or time-invariant components of transportation access.
It is worth considering potential omitted variables in ub,t that could influence the demand for betting
shops in a borough. We consider two candidates for such omitted variables (1) the expected future
income of a representative resident (EFIb,t) and (2) the density of alternative entertainment venues
(Entertainb,t), such as movie theaters, night-clubs, bingo shops, and arcades.
EFIb,t is part of the expected future income that is not explained by control variables in cb,t, such as
average housing price and unemployment rates.19 EFIb,t is positively correlated to the gambling demand
in at least two ways. First, when a gambler expects higher future income, his/her budget for gambling
activities increases (potentially cutting current savings) due to a permanent income effect. Second,
his/her chance of obtaining a financial loan improves, resulting in more money that can be spent on
gambling.20 Next, Entertainb,t measures the availability of alternative entertainment. Gambling is a
18Rather than using the narrowly defined crime categories (e.g. theft, violence, drug-dealing, and sexual offences), we
use the ‘total’ number of reported crimes (per capita) throughout this investigation. This is because the demand for
betting shops is likely to be affected not only by a specific type of crime but by any kind of crime. We base this argument
on the hypothesis that a risk-loving and instantaneous (yet myopic) gratifying nature is shared by betting activities and
all kinds of crime. Econometrically, we could focus on the causal investigation between a specific type of crime (e.g.
thefts) and betting shops in Equation (1). However, such a focus is expected to exacerbate the omitted variable problem
in our empirical investigation (e.g. if we only use theft crime data in Equation (1), the model fails to include the relation
with other types of crimes (such as violence and drug-dealing-related crimes) on betting shops).
19For example, if there is an unexpected announcement of local construction projects for the future, it will change the
income expectations among local construction workers.
20Similar to their popularity in the U.S., pay-day loan shops are popular in the U.K. where a
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form of entertainment which must compete with other entertainment services. In this sense, gambling
and other entertainment avenues are substitutes.
For the sake of simple interpretation, we split ub,t into
ub,t = δEFIb,t + θEntertainb,t + εb,t, (2)
where δ and θ are constant coefficients. We assume εb,t as i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks across boroughs,
yet they can be serially correlated within a borough. Among other factors, this could include local-level
advertisement expenditures, consistency of performance of local sports teams, and measurement error.
For this reason, robust standard errors clustered within a borough are used in the empirical section.
Lastly, we have to omit variables related to online betting due to lack of data. However, this
omission is unlikely to be a serious problem in our empirical analysis for the following three reasons.
First, according to the to the ‘British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010’ only 4% of people bet online.21
Thus, the influence of online betting on oﬄine betting is expected to be small. Second, the usage of
online betting can be reasonably assumed to be correlated with the average age of a borough resident,
as younger people are more familiar with using the internet. Our empirical model contains age and
age squared as control variables, hence it does not create an omitted variable bias. Third, Equation
(1) consists of borough fixed-effects and year-fixed effect dummies. These dummy variables are able to
capture borough-level heterogeneity and the London-wide time-trend of online betting.
3.1 An Instrumental Variable and Identifying Assumptions
Regarding Equation (1), it is natural to be concerned with reverse causality and endogeneity problems.
A reverse causality is based on the plausible possibility that some gamblers who lose money may attempt
to recover losses thorough criminal activities. Also, the model will suffer from endogeneity bias if any
of the omitted variables are correlated with crime. We reduce such econometric problems by using the
instrumental variable approach to isolate the variation in ln(Crimesb,t) which is uncorrelated with ub,t.
The instrument we use here is in the spirit of Hausman (2008). The instrument, zb,t, is constructed by
borrower can immediately borrow money on the agreement of paying it back on pay-day. News
media articulates the high correlation of pay-day loan shops and betting shops. For example:
www.theguardian.com/money/datablog/2014/mar/12/payday-lending-shops-boom-in-uk-the-full-data.
21See Table 2.1 of Wardle et al. (2010) for details.
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taking the log of averaged per capita crime in nearby connected boroughs,
zb,t = ln
 1
NNCB(b)
∑
a∈SNCB(b)
Crimesa,t
 , (3)
where SNCB(b) is the set of nearby connected boroughs, and NNCB(b) is the number of nearby con-
nected boroughs. For example, the log of crime rate in Harrow will be instrumented by the log of
averaged crime rates in Hillingdon, Ealing, Brent and Barnet.22
The identification assumptions (exclusion restrictions) are based on travelling patterns. Specifically,
we assume that a criminal may travel across boroughs to commit crimes, but a gambler does not travel
across boroughs to gamble. This is a reasonable assumption since betting shops are widespread (60
shops per borough on average) and provide nearly homogeneous gambling services and products (i.e.
betting events and odds have little variation across betting shops to prevent arbritrage). Thus, there
is not much incentive for a gambler to sacrifice his travel cost for visiting a distant betting shop in a
neighbouring borough. Empirically, this means that a change in the instrument does have negligible
influence on the omitted determinants of betting shop demand, but it is correlated with crime in a
borough. We expand on this idea in the rest of the section.
Our model and instrument are compatible with two well-known theories in criminology. The first
theory states that criminals conduct crimes near to where they live, because they have informational
advantages for successfully completing crimes (Wiles and Costello (2000)). The second is called ‘hot
spot’ theory, which describes that criminals travel to commit crimes in hot spots that have more crime
opportunities ( Brantingham and Brantingham (1999)). The first theory is compatible with our model
of Equation (1) in which individuals commit crimes in their resident boroughs, where they also visit local
betting shops. The second theory is compatible with the construction of the instrument in Equation
(3) in which criminals travel across boroughs to get to the hot spots.
Regarding the exogeneity condition of the instrument, it should be emphasised that committing
a crime in an area where an individual is not a resident requires substantial information.23 We argue
that such advanced information is available mostly among organised crime-group members who share
22Refer to Figure 1 for details of nearby connected boroughs.
23Such required information includes: knowledge of crime hot spot locations; knowledge of CCTV locations and their
covering angles; the deployments of local police officers and their shift and patrol patterns; knowledge of safe escaping
routes after a crime without the usage of a public transportation (as buses, tubes, and their stations are equipped with
CCTVs). It is worth noting that, based on advanced vision-analysing-computer programs, the cutting-edge technologies
of CCTVs allow police officers and security guards to automatically detect suspicious movements that criminals typically
make.
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information (e.g. locations of hot spots). Without such professional information, a person who commits
a crime in a remote borough has to bear a high risk of arrest. We base our instrument exogeneity on these
informational requirements among criminals. The detailed descriptions of the instrument exogeneity
are further developed in the Appendix.
4 Estimation Results and Policy Implications
This section discusses the estimation results, their economic interpretations, and policy implications.
Our main results, summarised in Table 2, report that a rise in crime increases the number of betting
shops in an area. Our explanations are threefold. First, we explain the importance of accounting for
borough-level heterogeneity and the bias caused by ignoring it. Second, we discuss the effect of omitted
variables and the role of the instrumental variable in mitigating the bias. Third, we discuss the effect
of accounting for both borough-level heterogeneity and omitted variables using a panel model with an
instrumental variable. Here, we also describe our main estimation result.
Finally, we briefly discuss the policy implications of our analysis. The Appendix contains the re-
gression results with the City of Westminster borough included and various robustness checks regarding
control variables.
4.1 Estimation Results
We compare the estimation results of (i) the OLS model and (iii) the panel fixed effect model as
reported in Table 2, to examine the effect of borough-level heterogeneity. In model (iii), F -statistics
of no borough effect has nearly zero p-value. This is naturally expected as we observe substantial
heterogeneity in Figures 3 and 4. Subsequently, we investigate whether the regressors are correlated
with the borough effects (αb) using the Hausman test (Hausman (1978)). The second column of Table
3 reports that the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that our regressors are correlated with borough
effects. This correlation is demonstrated by the large difference between the fixed-effect and random
effect panel models in (iii) and (iv). The estimated crime parameter shows that the omission of borough
effects creates an upward bias, as crime elasticity in the OLS model is 0.77, compared to the fixed-effect
panel model in which elasticity is 0.28. This suggests that crime and αb (such as gambling culture)
are positively correlated. This positive correlation is intuitive, as crime and gambling share the same
risk-loving and instantly-gratifying preferences.
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Table 2: Regression Results
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
OLS IV Panel Panel Panel Panel Lagged
Variable F.E. R.E. F.E. IV R.E. IV dependent
ln(Crimes) 0.769*** 1.852*** 0.280* 0.631*** 1.098* 1.236*** 0.0462*
(0.0806) (0.648) (0.163) (0.149) (0.660) (0.480) (0.0279)
Unemployment rate 0.0280*** -0.0306 0.00770 0.0147* 0.00433 0.00473 0.0018
(0.00905) (0.0384) (0.00723) (0.00883) (0.00963) (0.0100) (0.0026)
Avg. housing price -3.834*** -11.93** -7.468** -4.579** -9.190*** -9.033*** -0.3176
(0.727) (4.910) (2.721) (1.788) (3.155) (3.217) (0.2554)
Adult avg. age 0.0208 -0.0541 -1.609** -0.455* -1.658*** -1.458*** 0.0489
(0.0924) (0.134) (0.653) (0.272) (0.630) (0.562) (0.0326)
(Adult avg. age)2 -0.000185 0.00117 0.0201** 0.00533* 0.0200*** 0.0175*** -0.00051
(0.00108) (0.00167) (0.00743) (0.00308) (0.00715) (0.00633) (0.00038)
Gender ratio 0.514 0.959** 0.442 1.327* 1.633 1.919 0.2147**
(among adults) (0.327) (0.461) (0.975) (0.753) (1.469) (1.187) (0.0877)
Lag of ln(Betshops) 0.9082***
(0.0272)
Constant -7.520*** -3.694 23.78 1.660 27.23* 23.54* -2.0557***
(2.043) (3.649) (14.73) (6.202) (14.26) (12.64) (0.7896)
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 245
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borough effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Instrument No Yes No No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.634 0.398 0.964
The dependent variable is the log of number of betting shops per capita (ln(BetShops)).
Data includes all boroughs except the City of London and Westminster.
For panel regressions the standard errors are clustered at the borough level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Table 3: Hausman Test Results
Panels: Panel-IVs:
between model between model
(iii) and (iv) (v) and (vi)
χ2 statistic 64.61 1.65
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.9999)
Null hypothesis is that (instrumented) regressors
are uncorrelated with a borough effect.
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Next, we investigate the influence of omitted variables (primarily EFIb,t and Entertainb,t) and the
effectiveness of our instrument by comparing the parameters of IV and non-IV models. First, we
compare the estimates of (i) the OLS model and (ii) the IV model are reported in Table 2.24 The
elasticity of crime in the IV model (1.85) is more than double that of the OLS model (0.77) at the point
estimate. This implies that it is important to account for omitted variables.
Consequently, we examine the estimation results of (v) the panel fixed effect IV model and (vi) the
panel random effect IV model, which are reported in the last two columns of Table 2.25 The result of
the Hausman test, which examines whether instrumented regressors are correlated with borough effects
(αbs), is listed in the last column of Table 3. The Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis
of no correlation. This result is not surprising, as we construct our instrument by using the different
boroughs’ crime rates, while a borough effect captures gambling culture in a borough. Similar to the
OLS model and its IV-counterpart, we see a large difference between the crime elasticity in the random
effect IV model (1.24) and its non-IV counterpart, random effect model (0.63). This reaffirms the
importance of correcting the omitted variable bias.
The downward bias in the crime parameter of the non-IV models implies that crime in a borough is
negatively correlated with the unobserved betting shop demand shifters. It is important to understand
the economic arguments behind this downward bias, which suggests the following convariance structure,
Cov(ln(Crimesb,t),OVb,t) < 0, (4)
where omitted variable OVb,t can be EFIb,t or Entertainb,t. If a person expects a high future income and
improved access to financial loans (high EFIb,t), the propensity to commit a crime diminishes due to the
increased opportunity costs. This seems intuitive and in-line with classic crime studies such as Becker
(1968) and Ehrlich (1996). For the entertainment omitted variable, Entertainb,t, if potential gamblers
are budget-constrained, which is likely to happen as gamblers tend to live in more economically deprived
areas, they cannot afford to consume both gambling and other entertainment services. Therefore, the
prevalence of substitutable entertainment in a borough may prevent potential gamblers from visiting
betting shops. Moreover, even when a potential gambler is not budget constrained, as his/her demand
for excitement may be fulfilled by other entertainment avenues, he has less incentive to visit a betting
24In addition, the first stage regression results are reported in Table 4.
25We investigate the possibility of weak instrument by using Cragg-Donald F -statistic, suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2005), and could not find any significant evidence of weak instrument at reasonable maximum test sizes. See the
Appendix for the details.
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shop. As a result, there is less necessity for a person to commit a crime to recover lost money through
betting.26 Thus, the direction of omitted variable bias observed in the regression results seems to be
in-line with previous studies and economic intuition.
Our empirical investigation through (i) to (vi) in Table 2 relies primarily on static panel models. We
also examine a lagged-dependent variable model for testing dynamic causality in the simplest possible
manner. Here, the lagged dependent variable acts as a proxy for borough effects and omitted variables.
The estimation result in the model (vii) in Table 2 shows that, given last year’s betting shops and other
control variables, an increase in per capita crime of 1% leads to an 0.0462% increase in the number of
betting shops per capita. This further supports our claim.
Lastly, regarding the estimated coefficients of the control variables, boroughs with higher unemploy-
ment, cheaper housing, and a larger fraction of adult males are associated with having more betting
shops. A natural concern here is of multi-collinearity, since crime is usually associated with unemploy-
ment and cheap housing. We find a correlation coefficient of less than 0.5 in all cases, which mitigates
these worries. However, we exclude income as an explanatory variable due to its strong correlation
with unemployment and price of housing. Age has a parabolic relationship, decreasing until around
42 years old and increasing afterward. We understand that the control variables do not have a causal
interpretation, but having an intuitive sign on the parameter increases confidence in our model.
Given the above estimation results, we base our main empirical finding on the elasticity estimate of
1.2 in (vi) the random effect panel IV model in Table 2. The estimate is most reliable because: borough
effects and omitted variable bias are both accounted for; the result of first-stage regression rejects the
possibility of weak instrument with a conservative criteria; Hausman test fails to reject the consistency
of the estimator; and the estimator is asymptotically efficient.27
4.2 Policy Implications
We report that a 1% increase in per capita crime leads to a 1.2% increase in the number of betting
shops per capita. This implies that for every 1.4% increase in per capita crime a new betting shop
26A seminal study by Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) investigates the direct link between violent movies and local crimes
in the US from 1995 to 2004. They report that premieres of violent movies actually decrease local violent crimes, due
to (1) an incapacitation effect (i.e. a person cannot conduct violent activities while watching a violent movie) and (2) a
substitution effect (a person substitutes violence with watching a violent movie). In addition, Cunningham, Engelsta¨tter,
and Ward (2011) find a decrease of violent crimes after blockbuster sales of violent video games in the US between
2005-2008. Our reasoning behind Equation (4) is compatible with these findings.
27Note that the standard deviation of the causal parameter in model (vi) is smaller than that in model (v).
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opens up in a London borough, on average.28 This study is particularly relevant to U.K. policy as one
of the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act (2005) was to keep gambling crime-free. This paper
shows evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, if we accept that gambling shops also attract crime, the findings of our paper point to a
spiral-effect which can have serious consequences for the social environment.29
5 Conclusion
We investigate the causal effect of local crime on the number of betting shops in London boroughs
between 2007-2015. Using a novel instrument, average crime rates in neighbourhood boroughs, we
empirically find that a 1% increase in the crime rate causes a 1.2% increase in the number of betting
shops (per capita). Expressed in a different way, a new betting shop is opened in a borough for every
1.4% increase in local crime rate, on average. Our finding is significant and robust across a variety of
econometric specifications.
This study is a stepping stone for more work in this economically and socially important area. A
natural extension of our research is the long-term impact of betting shops on crime. In other words,
what happens to the crime rate when a new betting shop opens? More research in this area is needed
to derive comprehensive policy recommendations.
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6 Appendix
This appendix reports the results of the first stage estimations, weak instrument tests, the estimation
results with the City of Westminster included, robustness checks with the omission of control variables,
and the figures of the population un-adjusted variables.
6.1 First Stage Regression Results and Test of Weak Instrument
Table 4 summarises the first-stage regression results used for the estimation methods reported in models
(ii), (v), and (vi) in Table 2. Regarding the possibility of a weak instrument, we calculate the Cragg-
Donald F -test statistic, which are examined by Stock and Yogo (2005) and Stock et al. (2012). Following
their method, we use the maximum test size criterion, as we test the existence of causality between
crime and betting shops. According to Table 5.2 of Stock and Yogo (2005), the critical value of the
Cragg-Donald F -test statistic is 8.96 (with a maximum test size of 0.15) and 16.38 (with a maximum
test size of 0.10) at α = 0.05. These statistics are listed on the bottom row of Table 4. Our instrument
used in (ii) the IV model does not satisfy any of these criterions. However, the F -statistic of (v) the
panel fixed effect IV model exceeds the critical value of 8.96 (maximum test size 0.15), and the F -
statistic in (vi) the panel random effect model further excels the critical value of 16.38 (maximum test
size 0.10). Accordingly, we can safely ignore the concern of a weak instrument in the model (vi), on
which we base our main empirical finding.
Table 4: First Stage IV Regression Results
(ii) (v) (vi)
IV Panel Panel
Variable F.E. IV R.E. IV
Log of geographically 0.1827*** 0.5112*** 0.6232***
connected borough crimes (zb,t) (0.0653) (0.1673) (0.1507)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Observations 276 276 276
R-squared 0.8180
t-statistic 2.798 3.056 4.135
Cragg-Donald F -test statistic 7.828 9.337 17.101
Dependent variable is the log of crime rate (ln(Crimesb,t)).
Data includes all boroughs except the City of London and Westminster.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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6.2 Detailed Descriptions for Instrument Exogeneity
Regarding the validity of our instrument, the instrument exogeneity condition E[zb,tub,t] = 0 is satisfied
if Cov(zb,t,EFIb,t) = 0 and Cov (zb,t, Entertainb,t) = 0 hold. We now illustrate these two conditions.
First, if the condition of Cov(zb,t,EFIb,t) = 0 is violated, it means that connected boroughs’ crime
conditions affect the future employability among residents in a borough b, even after adjusted by
control variables (or vice versa). This correlation story basically means (1) crime activities in connected
boroughs create a macro economic change that affects the future income prospects of a resident in a
different borough b, or (2) a variation in EFIb,t changes crime activities that happen in connected
boroughs. We claim neither (1) nor (2) is plausible for the following reasons. Criminal activities are
generally not considered to have macro effects in a developed country. Furthermore, a person, whose
EFIb,t may change, has a legitimate job (or has the ability to have a legitimate job in the future) is less
likely to be a crime-group member who can make his living through crimes. This is because someone
with a legitimate job (or prospect to have a legitimate job) may lose future employability upon an
arrest.
Second, the validity of Cov(zb,t, Entertainb,t) = 0 is summarised by the following points. When
connected boroughs experience changes in their crime rates (i.e. a change in zb,t), such as the new
emergence of crime ‘hot spots’, some criminals who live in borough b travel to these new spots in
connected boroughs. However, the availability of entertainment (Entertainb,t) in borough b is unlikely
to be affected, as new crime hot spots are emerging in geographically-separate boroughs. Next, a
change in Entertainb,t in a borough is unlikely to affect crimes in connected boroughs for the following
reasons. Any change in Entertainb,t affects the demand for betting shops among potential gamblers who
substitute betting with other entertainment activities. These people are considered to be non-serious
and non-addict gamblers (as they may give up betting if other entertainments are available) and are less
likely to lose large amounts of money, which may result in serious criminal behaviour. Furthermore, it
is even more unlikely that this group of people has strong risk-seeking preferences, which can motivate
them to travel and commit a crime in a remote borough where they do not have the advantage of local
information. Thus, the likelihood of committing crimes in a connected borough could reasonably be
considered negligibly small for these substituting gamblers.
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6.3 Robustness Checks - Including the City of Westminster
Table 5 reports the regression results with the City of Westminster included. The estimates of the
causal parameter are similar to those in Table 2, except for the following two major points. First, the
OLS estimate of the crime coefficient in model (i) in Table 2 and that of (i) the OLS model in Table
5 are largely different. This difference is considered to be created by the large borough-effect term
of Westminster (αb=Westminster) which is captured in an OLS error term and causes an upward bias.
Second, the estimate in model (iii) in Table 5 loses significance. This is not a serious problem as the
panel fixed effect model is not instrumented, and the parameter is downwardly biased towards zero.
Overall, these estimates in Table 5 are further supporting our empirical finding on the causality.
Table 5: Regression Results: Including the City of Westminster Data
(i) (ii) (iii) (v) (v) (vi) (vii)
OLS IV Panel Panel Panel Panel Lagged
Variables F.E. R.E. F.E. IV R.E. IV dependent
ln(Crimes) 1.325*** 1.758** 0.221 0.744*** 1.063* 1.085* 0.0765***
(0.0830) (0.684) (0.145) (0.150) (0.594) (0.576) (0.0291)
Unemployment rate 0.000378 -0.0229 0.00802 0.0155* 0.00795 0.00806 -0.00168
(0.00983) (0.0402) (0.00703) (0.00895) (0.00871) (0.00882) (0.00243)
Avg. housing price -6.011*** -10.54 -6.121** -2.791 -7.066** -7.001** -0.457*
(0.965) (7.263) (2.720) (2.425) (3.459) (3.497) (0.264)
Adult avg. age 0.0698 -0.0216 -1.509** -0.394 -1.485** -1.476** 0.0525
(0.105) (0.194) (0.701) (0.321) (0.746) (0.740) (0.0337)
(Adult avg. age)2 -0.000352 0.000806 0.0191** 0.00479 0.0183** 0.0181** -0.000512
(0.00120) (0.00234) (0.00796) (0.00360) (0.00850) (0.00843) (0.000389)
Adult gender ratio 1.551*** 1.121 0.298 1.845** 1.259 1.308 0.290***
(0.362) (0.783) (0.970) (0.823) (1.265) (1.242) (0.0895)
Lag of ln(Betshops) 0.938***
(0.0208)
Constant -8.599*** -4.916 21.31 -0.239 23.20 23.10 -1.9141
(2.335) (6.606) (15.78) (7.322) (16.46) (16.32) (0.7934)
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 253
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borough effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Instrument No Yes No No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.760 0.723 0.983
The dependent variable is the log of number of betting shops per capita (ln(Betshops)).
Data includes all boroughs except the City of London.
For panel regressions the standard errors are clustered at the borough level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
6.4 Robustness Checks - Control Variables
Robustness checks are implemented to understand the effect of control variables on the crime elasticity
(causal parameter). The results of robustness checks are listed in Table 6. As our main empirical results
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are based on (vi) the panel random effect IV model in Table 2, we primarily analyse estimation model
(vi-1), (vi-2), and (vi-3) in Table 6.30
The model (vi-1) in Table 6 omits the time fixed effect (λt). This leads to a decrease in magnitude
of the crime parameter, and the significance is lost. This happens because we omit time fixed effects
which is now absorbed by the error term in Equation (1) and the decreasing trend in crime (Figure 4).
The model (vi-2) in Table 6 reports the estimation results with the omission of unemployment
and average housing price. By omitting these control variables, we fail to account for the unobserved
heterogeneity related to present income (and part of the future income). Accordingly, we observe a
downward bias in the crime parameter due to the negative correlation between crime and income.
The model (vi-3) in Table 6 reports the results with the omission of age and gender-ratio variables.
30The results of panel fixed effect IV models (v-1), (v-2), and (v-3) are quite similar.
Table 6: Control Variables - Robustness Check
(v-1) (v-2) (v-3) (vi-1) (vi-2) (vi-3)
Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel
Variable F.E. IV F.E. IV F.E. IV R.E. IV R.E. IV R.E. IV
ln(Crimes) 0.162 1.095 1.267** 0.138 0.769*** 1.213***
(0.112) (0.707) (0.560) (0.110) (0.266) (0.355)
Unemployment rate 0.000277 0.00754 0.00824 0.00670
(0.00471) (0.0118) (0.00548) (0.0122)
Avg. housing price -5.296*** -8.631*** -1.320 -8.378***
(1.842) (2.957) (1.298) (2.613)
Adult avg. age -1.795*** -2.462*** -0.969** -0.663**
(0.681) (0.705) (0.424) (0.307)
(Adult avg. age)2 0.0223*** 0.0283*** 0.0112** 0.00774**
(0.00774) (0.00816) (0.00476) (0.00344)
Gender ratio 0.424 1.710 1.588* 1.270
(among adults) (1.078) (1.432) (0.888) (0.896)
Constant 27.50* 45.96*** -4.804*** 11.20 6.433 -4.951***
(15.38) (15.86) (1.561) (9.678) (7.084) (1.050)
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276
Year F.E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Borough effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared
The dependent variable here in the log of number of betting shops per capita (ln(Betshops)).
Data includes all boroughs except the City of London and Westminster.
For panel regressions the standard errors are clustered at the borough level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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The estimates of model (vi) and (vi-3) are close, indicating that these two variables have little effect
for controlling unobserved variables.
6.5 Figures of Population Un-Adjusted Variables
Figures 6 - 8 report the population un-adjusted numbers of betting shops and crimes. Similar to
the population-adjusted equivalents in Figures 3 - 5, outliers in these figures are all from the City
of Westminster. Compared to the population adjusted variables, we find similar patterns; there is
substantial heterogeneity across boroughs, and the numbers of betting shops and crimes are strongly
correlated. The correlation coefficient in Figure 8 is 0.823 (significant at α = 0.01).
Figure 6: Number of Betting Shops by Bor-
ough
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Figure 7: Number of Crimes by Borough
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Figure 8: Annual Borough-Level Number of Betting Shops and Crimes for 2007-2015
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